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Case No. 20090894-SC 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TROVON DONTA ROSS 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH 
Respondent and Appellee 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. ROSS'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL 
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WAS PERMISSIBLE 
UNDER THE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT. 
A. Mr. Ross was Denied the Protections of the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. 
Mr. Ross requested post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial 
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to address the affirmative 
defense of "extreme emotional distress" at trial and on appeal. (PR. 000005, 7-8, 
101, 108, 122, 124.)1 In response, the State asserted that Mr. Ross's claims were 
"procedurally barred" because he could have raised them on direct appeal. The 
State continues to make that claim here, but it is incorrect. 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") states that "a person may be 
eligible for relief [under this Act] on a basis that the ground could have been but 
1
 "PR" refers to the Post-Conviction Record; "TR" refers to the Trial Record. 
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was not raised at trial and on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(3) (2008). 
Mr. Ross has argued in the post-conviction proceedings that his trial counsel 
and appellate counsel should have raised the affirmative defense of extreme 
emotional distress at trial or on appeal, but they failed to do so "due to ineffective 
assistance of counsel." See id.; (PR. 000005, 7-8, 101, 108, 122, 124.) Because 
Mr. Ross has claimed ineffective assistance of counsel against both his trial and 
appellate counsel, the procedural bar is expressly inapplicable here. 
B. Mr. Ross's Claim of Appellate Counsel's Ineffective Assistance 
Was Procedurally Permissible and Supported By the Record. 
In the Brief of the Appellee ("St. Br."), the State argues that Mr. Ross's 
claims fail because he does not explain why he could not have raised ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. (St. Br. at 15.) But the State has 
applied an incorrect standard. Mr. Ross is not required under the doctrine in 
Strickland v. Washington to explain "why he could not have raised on direct appeal 
his claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness." (Id.) Rather, he is required to show that 
appellate counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Pursuant to that requirement, Mr. 
Ross stated in his opening brief that appellate counsel's ineffective performance 
prevented the claims against trial counsel from being properly identified and 
raised. (Aplt. Br. at 32-33.) Specifically, trial counsel's failure to raise the extreme 
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emotional distress affirmative defense was not investigated and/or raised by 
appellate counsel, even though the availability and applicability of the defense was 
obvious from the trial record. (Aplt. Br. at 27-29.) Indeed, Mr. Ross has shown 
"that appellate counsel omitted an issue which is obvious from the trial record and 
one which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal." Taylor v. State, 
2007 UT 12, \ 7, 156 P.3d 739 (citations omitted). 
In the post-conviction proceedings, the court erroneously concluded that Mr. 
Ross's rights had been protected because of the availability of a Rule 23B hearing. 
See Utah R. App. P. 23B; (See PR. 000361.) Rule 23B allows appellate counsel to 
investigate and bring an apparent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the 
appellate court's attention. The rule is only available on direct appeal and it serves 
to protect a defendant against ineffective assistance of trial counsel only if 
appellate counsel investigates the defendant's case and makes a request for a 
hearing under the rule. In this case, appellate counsel did none of these things. 
Thus the rule did not serve to protect Mr. Ross against the ineffective assistance of 
his trial counsel. The availability of a procedural tool that was left unused by his 
appellate counsel prevented Mr. Ross from developing his legitimate claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective. Indeed, the safeguarding function of Rule 23B was 
never realized, and, to date, because of appellate counsel's inadequate assistance, 
Mr. Ross has been denied an adequate opportunity to address whether his trial 
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counsel's assistance was deficient. If the record had pointed to a reasonable 
strategy for not raising the issue on appeal, it would be incumbent on Mr. Ross to 
affirmatively show something more in order to establish appellate counsel's 
deficient performance. But this record points to no strategy whatsoever for failing 
to raise the issue on direct appeal. Given the silent record at trial for counsel's 
reason to forgo the extreme emotional distress affirmative defense, appellate 
counsel should have recognized the shortcoming and investigated the issue via a 
23B proceeding. A proper 23B motion would have protected Mr. Ross's rights. 
Thus, on its face, the record supports that appellate counsel's performance 
was deficient and, but for that deficient performance, the result on appeal would 
have been different. {See Aplt. Br. at 23.) 
C. Mr, Ross's Claim of Trial Counsel's Ineffective Assistance Was 
Procedurally Permissible and Supported By the Record, 
The State claims that the post-conviction court's ruling for summary 
judgment was correct because trial counsel's decision not to raise the extreme 
emotional defense was strategic and Mr. Ross agreed to that strategy. (St. Br. at 
16.) Also, the State seems to claim that Mr. Ross has not rebutted the strong 
presumption of reasonableness that applies to trial counsel's strategic decisions in a 
criminal case. 
But Mr. Ross has argued in the post-conviction proceedings and in the < 
opening brief that a "strategy" alone is not enough under the law; trial counsel 
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provides effective assistance only if the strategy is reasonable. Also, Mr. Ross has 
filed pleadings and papers in the post-conviction court that raise an issue of 
material fact concerning the unreasonableness of defense counsel's decision not to 
present the extreme emotional defense. The pleadings and papers rebut the 
presumption of reasonableness where defense counsel apparently misunderstood 
the law. Moreover, based on defense counsel's misunderstanding of the law, Mr. 
Ross's post-conviction filings raise an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Ross 
received competent legal assistance when he purportedly agreed to a strategy to 
waive an affirmative defense that would have been supported by the facts. Where 
counsel was ineffective, Mr. Ross's purported agreement was irrelevant. 
1. Counsel Must Use a Strategy that is Reasonable. 
Counsel must use a strategy that is reasonable, but in Mr. Ross's case, 
counsel did not. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment because it 
determined that "the trial record conclusively demonstrate^] that petitioner's trial 
counsel's decision not to raise the 'extreme emotional distress' affirmative defense 
was . . . strategic " (PR. 000363). That ruling does not support summary 
judgment. Indeed, the law requires counsel's strategy to be "reasonable" to 
overcome a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
688. An unreasonable strategy violates a defendant's rights. State v. Hales, 2007 
UT 14, f^ 69, 152 P.3d 321. In this case, the trial record is silent as to whether 
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counsel actually had a strategy, and if there was a discernable strategy, the 
reasonableness of counsel's strategy. Mr. Ross's pleadings and papers in the 
post-conviction proceedings support that trial counsel's purported strategy was 
based on a misunderstanding of the lawr. 
2. The Post-Conviction Filings Support That Trial Counsel 
Failed to Raise an Affirmative Defense Supported by the 
Facts. 
I t is i m p o r t a n t to re i terate that an a t tn rnev has a d n t v to ad^nna te l v 
investigate the claims and defenses available to a client. See State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); Hales, 2007 UT at 1f 69, (citations omitted). "If 
counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case . . . counsel's 
performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.55' Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). "This 
is because a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision.5' 
Id. Counsel also has an obligation to stay current on the relevant law, and a failure 
to do so constitutes objectively deficient performance. See State v. Moritzsky, 111 
P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Likewise, counsel's performance is deemed 
to be deficient and prejudicial if he fails to present evidence and argument 
challenging the facts that would warrant a lesser charge. See State v. Moore, 2009 
UT App 386, ffif 9-10, 223 P.3d 1137 cert, granted, 238 P.3d 443 (Utah 2010). An 
rr x* * x. _ x * _ i _ i ~ * ~ ~ „ 1 i± * i i i ? „ : i ~ ±~ 
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inform the defendant of an affirmative defense that could materially affect a 
potential conviction such that the defendant does not understand the legal 
significance and consequences of a particular legal strategy. See Adams v. State, 
2005 UT 62, ffif 23-24, 123 P.3d 400. 
Relevant to this case, the extreme emotional distress affirmative defense to 
aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder was available to Mr. Ross. 
Pursuant to the version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (2003) in effect at the time 
of the shootings in Mr. Ross's case, extreme emotional distress was aan affirmative 
defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted aggravated murder [when] 
the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of 
another: (i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse." Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202. 
The "defense was generally enacted by states in response to the unworkable 
nature of the heat of passion defense." State v. White, 2011 UT 21, \ 25, 251 P.3d 
820. ("State v. White IF) (citations omitted). "The defense was meant to 
substantially enlarge the class of cases that might be reduced to manslaughter and 
to do away with categories of adequate provocation which had developed in the 
cases . . . to make it more accessible to criminal defendants and to move away from 
a case-by-case examination of whether the ctype' of provocation rendered the 
defendant's reaction reasonable." Id. at fflf 25-33 (citations and quotations 
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omitted). "A person acts under the influence of extreme emotional distress when 
he is exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress that would cause the 
average reasonable person under the same circumstances to experience a loss of 
self-control, and be overborne by intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, 
grief, excessive agitation, or other similar emotions." Id. at f 26 (citations and 
quotations omitted). The defense is available if there is "'any reasonable basis' 
upon which the jury should be allowed to consider the extreme emotional distress 
defense at trial." Id. at ^ [33. 
The extreme emotional distress affirmative defense applies when the 
external circumstances provoke the defendant to respond, albeit unlawfully, and 
does not turn on whether his acts or reactions were reasonable, but whether a 
reasonable person would experience distress under the circumstances. See id. at f^ 
37; State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471-72 (Utah 1988) (ruling that instructions for 
extreme-emotional distress manslaughter "should not be read as requiring the jury 
to find that defendant's acts of killing were reasonable.") overruled on other 
grounds by, State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). 
If the defense had been properly raised at Mr. Ross's trial, Mr. Ross would 
have been convicted only of murder and attempted murder and his sentence would 
have been five years to life, rather than life without parole. See Utah Code Ann. 
Q 
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§§ 76-5-202 (2003), 76-3-203 (2003), and 76-5-203 (2003). But the defense was 
not raised. 
Mr. Ross has raised a genuine issue of material fact whether he was entitled 
to raise an extreme emotional distress affirmative defense because he had been 
subjected to highly provocative triggers which resulted in the loss of self-control. 
Both the trial record and Mr. Ross's petition for post-conviction relief show that he 
had a long-term and intimate relationship with Ms. Christensen that dated back to 
late 2000 or early 2001. Upon arriving at Ms. Christensen5s house on the morning 
at issue, Mr. Ross suddenly realized that she just spent the night with another man 
and that she had been lying to him. (See PR. 000086, 88, 92-93, 96, 98, 99). That 
realization was particularly distressing to Mr. Ross because, just one day earlier, 
Ms. Christensen had been intimate with Mr. Ross and they had recently made 
promises to be in a committed relationship. (See PR. 000074, 88, 92-93). 
Importantly, the defense of extreme emotional distress does not require a 
contemporaneous trigger which causes a person to lose self-control. State v. White 
77,2011 UT at U 30.2 
Based on the current interpretations of the law at the time of Mr. Ross's Opening 
Brief, the court of appeals had mistakenly interpreted a claim of extreme emotional 
distress as being available only where a highly provocative and contemporaneous 
trigger causes a person to lose self-control. State v. White, 2009 UT App 81, 
1J1J24-25, 206 P.3d 646 ("State v. WhiteI"). Subsequently, on April 19, 2011, this 
Court clarified that "the court of appeals decision imposes a standard more 
exacting than the statute mandates." State v. White II, 2011 UT at 1f 18. 
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It is undisputed that Mr. Ross did not arrive at Ms. Christensen's house in a 
rage. (See TR. 433:44-45). Yet, overcome by extreme feelings of jealousy, 
passion, anger, and distress, he reacted in an extreme and emotional manner upon 
"discovering that 'the love of his life' had lied to him and was actually caught 
sleeping with another man." (PR. 000081, 86, 88, 92-93, 95, 98, 99). His extreme 
and emotional response was to kill the woman he loved and then shoot at the 
person who had come between them. (PR. 000081, 88-90, 92-93, 96, 99; TR: 
433:47-50). 
Had Mr. Ross's trial counsel investigated and/or offered evidence supporting 
the nature and intensity of his relationship with Ms. Christensen or the fact that Mr. 
Ross's original calm disposition quickly escalated after discovering Ms. 
Christensen had slept with Mr. May, the jury likely would have concluded that he 
was acting under extreme emotional distress. See State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, 
^J 41-44, 262 P.3d 1. Indeed, the facts would have been sufficient to enable a 
reasonable jury to find that Mr. Ross was suffering from intense feelings including 
jealousy, passion, anger, or distress. (PR. 000081, 88-90, 92-93, 98, 106). The 
facts show Mr. Ross was provoked by the emotionally distressing circumstances he 
encountered. Thus, a reasonable jury would have found that Mr. Ross experienced 
a provocative trigger capable of causing an extreme emotional reaction. The 
numerous facts in the record suggesting Mr. Ross reacted to extreme emotional 
/1QO< 07 / fO A-JIO /I i n 
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distress make it obvious that trial counsel could have and should have investigated 
•3 
and/or raised the affirmative defense. 
3. The Post-Conviction Filings Support That Defense Counsel 
Failed to Raise the Affirmative Defense Because He 
Misunderstood the Law, and thus, the Strategy was 
Unreasonable. 
The presumption that Mr. Ross's trial counsel's conduct fell within "the 
wide range of professional assistance" is overcome because there are sufficient 
facts showing that counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial. At trial, 
defense counsel stated cryptically on the record that he was not raising extreme 
emotional distress as a defense on Mr. Ross's behalf "because of evidentiary 
problems as are known to Mr. Ross and myself." (PR. 000328). But trial counsel 
never said what the evidentiary problems were and there is no evidence in the 
record suggesting potential evidentiary problems significant enough to undermine 
assertion of an affirmative defense. Instead, the record supports that defense 
counsel misunderstood the defense. In particular, Mr. Ross filed papers in the 
post-conviction proceedings to support that counsel "informed" him that the 
defense was precluded because "mental evaluations were holding him of sound 
mind." (PR. 000336.) The post-conviction filings raise questions suggesting that 
counsel misunderstood the law. (See PR. 000328; 336). Indeed, even if Mr. Ross 
"5 
This Court need not determine that the foregoing facts are true, but only that they 
are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact and that the post-conviction court 
erred in granting summary judgment without a hearing 
1 1 
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was of "sound mind" at the time of the shootings, under the law, this would not 
have prevented his assertion of an extreme emotional distress affirmative defense. 
Soundness of mind does not preclude an extreme emotional distress affirmative 
defense. Trial counsel's misunderstanding of the law led to an unreasonable 
strategic decision. Trial counsel also told the court that the "reasonableness of that 
strategy" would be shown when Mr. Ross testified at the sentencing hearing. (PR. 
000328). But no sentencing hearing was held and no explanation was ever 
proffered. 
Without an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court had no basis for 
determining that trial counsel's strategy was reasonable. The record contains no 
reasons for the purported strategy, nor any analysis to support it. The record 
demonstrates that trial counsel did not make an opening argument, did not cross 
examine most of the State's witnesses, did not provide any affirmative evidence or 
testimony explaining why Mr. Ross did what he did, failed to request jury 
instructions, failed to develop or present the affirmative defense of extreme 
emotional distress, and entirely foreclosed any consideration of the defense in his 
closing argument. Indeed, rather than identify and explain the impact of the 
emotional triggers for Mr. Ross's conduct, trial counsel actually encouraged the 
jury to look favorably on the fact that Mr. Ross " . . . to his credit did not take the 
witness stand and . . . attempt to offer some excuse or justification for his actions." 
1 ^ 
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(TR. 434:12). Given this argument, there is no way the jury could have considered 
that extreme emotional distress might have caused Mr. Ross's unlawful conduct. 
{See TR. 434:12). A proper defense requires investigation, evidence, jury 
instructions, and effective argument, while not foreclosing important affirmative 
defenses. 
In sum, trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and raise the extreme 
emotional distress affirmative defense demonstrates the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to whether counsel's performance was defective 
and prejudicial to the outcome of the case. Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Ross, trial counsel's failure to raise the affirmative defense 
constituted deficient performance because counsel failed to fully advocate Mr. 
Ross's position and protect his rights at trial. Trial counsel's failure prejudiced his 
rights because Mr. Ross was denied the opportunity to have a jury consider a 
defense that may have lessened his conviction and sentence. The presence of such 
facts are sufficient to rebut any presumption of trial counsel's strategy because 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failure, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different. Mr. Ross should be entitled to a hearing. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS AFFIRMATIVE BURDEN TO 
DEMONSTRATE THERE WERE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
"Because summary judgment is a drastic remedy, we generally require strict 
compliance with the rules governing summary judgment." Kelt v. State, 2008 UT 
62, *{ 48, 194 P.3d 913 (citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only 
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A summary judgment movant must show both that 
there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,1J10, 177 P.3d 600 citing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). "Utah law does not allow a summary judgment movant to merely 
point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving party's case, but instead requires a 
movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact." Id. at Tf 16. The facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Id. at^[6. 
In this case, summary judgment was not appropriate because the State failed 
to affirmatively show there was no material issue of fact. Id. at % 10 citing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c). At the post-conviction stage of this case, the State moved for 
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summary judgment on Mr. Ross's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel 
without meeting its burden to demonstrate there were no issues of disputed fact. 
Indeed, there remained significant facts in dispute pertaining to whether Mr. Ross 
received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. 
Mr. Ross attempted to navigate the procedural maze of the PCRA by filing 
his petition for relief and, soon thereafter, responding to the State's motion for 
summary judgment. Notwithstanding that he had twice been denied appointment 
of pro bono counsel, Mr. Ross, proceeding on his own, argued that the system had 
failed him by not providing him with effective assistance of counsel at trial and on 
appeal. Mr. Ross specifically identified trial counsel's failure to assert the 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress as the basis for his claim of 
ineffective assistance. Likewise, Mr. Ross identified appellate counsel's failure to 
investigate the reasons for trial counsel's failure to assert the affirmative defense 
and appellate counsel's failure to request a Rule 23B hearing. Furthermore, Mr. 
Ross was denied the opportunity to conduct discovery to support his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, Mr. Ross was forced to litigate his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims without the assistance of a pro bono 
attorney and without proper evidentiary support. In short, the post-conviction 
court prevented Mr. Ross from having a full and fair opportunity to discover and 
present evidence to support his claims. 
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At the post-conviction stage, the State disputed Mr. Ross's arguments that he 
had received ineffective assistance, yet the State never affirmatively showed the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The State continues to argue that Mr. 
Ross had the burden to proffer evidence that counsel was ineffective and that he 
had to allege the reasons that his trial counsel chose not to raise the defense, even 
though the evidence supported it, and then explain why those reasons were 
inadequate. (St. Br. at 11-12.) But Mr. Ross's petition supports a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The pleadings on file and the record of the 
underlying criminal proceedings support deficient performance and the prejudice 
resulting therefrom. Moreover, as this Court held in Orvis, on a motion for 
summary judgment, it is not Mr. Ross's burden to demonstrate a material issue of 
fact, it is the State's burden to demonstrate the absence of a material issue. See 
Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at \\ 0 citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The State's argument would put an untenable burden on Mr. Ross. First, it 
assumes Mr. Ross had adequate legal resources and sufficient understanding of the 
law to articulate the law and apply it to his case. Second, if accepted by this Court, 
the State's argument enables the State to use the "presumption of reasonableness" 
as a shield to prevent a petitioner from being able to properly develop his claims 
when the trial record is silent on the issue and appellate counsel fails to use a 23B 
hearing to fill in any deficiencies. Mr. Ross is not seeking to avoid his ultimate 
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burden to prove that counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial, but the 
State should not be allowed to take refuge in the omissions of attorneys who fail to 
ensure a complete record. In reality, the State's argument all but concedes that an 
evidentiary hearing was necessary so that Mr. Ross could develop sufficient facts 
to support his allegations. 
The State argues that trial counsel had a strategy simply because he made 
reference to a "strategic decision" based on evidentiary problems. (St. Br. at 12.) 
The trial attorney claimed that the reasons were known to Mr. Ross, but all we can 
glean from the record is that the attorney misunderstood the law. Trial counsel's 
mere statement that a "strategy" existed does not demonstrate what the strategy 
was, that the "strategy" was reasonable, or that Mr. Ross understood and agreed 
with the strategy. The record as a whole is silent as to what strategy trial counsel 
may have been attempting to employ. Neither trial nor appellate counsel ever 
disclosed what the purported strategy might be. It appears the more plausible 
explanation is that trial counsel misunderstood the law and Mr. Ross was left with 
ineffective assistance. The record's silence demonstrates that disputed issues of 
material fact remained unresolved. 
Indeed, the presumption of reasonableness of trial counsel's strategy is cast 
in doubt, if not completely overcome by the implausibility that Mr. Ross would 
have knowingly and voluntarily given up an opportunity to have his conviction 
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and/or punishment lessened without receiving any benefit in return. Why would a 
person knowingly agree to a "strategy" to forego the opportunity to be convicted of 
a lesser offense when he was not disputing the fact that he had committed a crime? 
Why wouldn't appellate counsel investigate whether trial counsel was reasonable 
in employing a strategy that included relinquishing a valuable defense that could 
have had a significant impact on Mr. Ross's sentence? 
Absent meaningful legal guidance at the post-conviction stage, Mr. Ross 
attempted to articulate how his trial and appellate counsel's performance were 
deficient and prejudiced his defense. Although his attempt may have lacked 
sophistication, the fact remains that the State never met its burden to affirmatively 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Consequently, the post-conviction 
court erred when it made the factual determinations that trial counsel strategically 
decided to not raise the extreme emotional distress affirmative defense, (PR. 
000365), and that trial counsel's decision not to raise the extreme emotional 
distress affirmative defense was agreed to by Mr. Ross. (PR. 000363.) Summary 
judgment on Mr. Ross's claims for ineffective assistance was improperly granted. 
III. MR. ROSS'S REQUESTS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF PRO 
BONO COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
The court may appoint counsel to an indigent petitioner seeking 
post-conviction relief when the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations 
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that will require an evidentiary hearing, and the petition involves complicated 
issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109 (2008). The PCRA is comprised of "extraordinary, 
complex legal doctrines" and it is a "legal fiction" and "deliberate fantasy" that 
post-conviction proceedings may be handled competently by an unrepresented 
indigent defendant. Parsons v. Barnes,871 P.2d 516, 530-31 (Utah 1994) 
(Zimmerman, J. concurring). Thus, pro bono counsel is often necessary to assist a 
defendant in developing his post-conviction claims. 
Twice, Mr. Ross requested pro bono counsel, but was denied by the court on 
the grounds that his requests were "premature" and "the complexity of [Mr. 
Ross's] remaining claims [for ineffective assistance of counsel] and the need for 
appointment of counsel for the proper adjudication of such claims is uncertain at 
this time." (PR. 000012-13; PR. 000265-266). Proceeding on his own, Mr. Ross 
attempted to set forth the facts showing the ineffective assistance rendered by trial 
and appellate counsel, but October 7, 2009, the court granted summary judgment. 
(PR. 000353-366, 383-385). 
It is difficult to imagine how a lay person could possibly investigate, 
evaluate, and present claims of ineffective assistance without the benefit of counsel 
because such claims necessarily involve complicated factual and legal issues and 
often require evidentiary hearings. See e.gs., State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, 
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1111, WL 5393676 (Utah Ct. App., Dec. 30, 2010); State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 
355, If 11, 2010 WL 5121491 (Utah Ct. App., Dec. 16, 2010). How can a lay 
person evaluate whether his lawyers effectively analyzed the law and the facts and 
made reasonable strategic decisions? 
The State compliments Mr. Ross's ability to proceed on his own and timely 
file his petition for relief, impliedly suggesting that he had the wherewithal to 
anctiyz^c ai±u cuuouicuc m s uicuiiis. yoi. D I . ai JLZ, -U, ly.j vii&CL uic oiaic 5 
argument, Mr. Ross should have been able to do what his trial and appellate 
counsel were unable to do. The State's logic only highlights the need for counsel 
to clear the hurdles or navigate the maze of the PCRA and to effectively present a 
claim of ineffective assistance. 
This need for appointment of counsel could not be more apparent from the 
State's condemnation of Mr. Ross for having "never renewed his motion after he 
received the State's summary judgment motion." (St. Br. at 26.) Mr. Ross twice 
requested pro bono counsel to assist him from the beginning, not merely in 
response to a dispositive motion filed many months after his initial petition and 
requests. The need for early appointment of counsel is further exemplified by the 
State's conclusion that since Mr. Ross did not request assistance of counsel for a 
third time, he "tacitly conceded that he did not need counsel's assistance to 
respond to the State's motion." (St. Br. at 12-13.) This Court has never allowed a 
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right to counsel to be "tacitly" waived. If the State were correct, then it has 
successfully inserted a new procedural hurdle into the PCRA process which would 
require an indigent petitioner to renew a motion for counsel at every procedural 
juncture. How many times should a petitioner have to ask for counsel in the course 
of one post-conviction proceeding? 
To resolve whether trial counsel was ineffective, Mr. Ross simply needed 
brief fact discovery and an evidentiary hearing with the assistance of competent 
counsel. Mr. Ross is not a lawyer. He was entitled to rely on the guidance and 
advice of his attorneys at trial and on appeal. See State v. Holland ("Holland I"), 
876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) appeal after remand, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996) 
("In almost all cases, defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of their 
attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their fair treatment under the 
law."). To expect a lay person to recognize when and how his attorneys fail to 
protect his rights contradicts the very reason that a defendant employs a trained 
advocate to competently represent his rights. Only a lawyer could effectively 
evaluate whether previous counsel met the standard of care and made appropriate 
and reasonable strategy decisions. Without the appointment of competent pro 
bono counsel to assist with a post-conviction petition, it is entirely unfair to think 
an incarcerated, indigent petitioner could evaluate his attorneys' performance and 
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recognize specific instances when the attorneys' conduct and strategies fell below 
the standard of reasonableness. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Ross respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the summary judgment and remand for an evidentiary hearing with 
instructions to appoint counsel to assist Mr. Ross. 




PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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